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“The glass vase on the table is fragile.” One way to think about this statement is 
that “fragility” refers to a property of the vase. The vase's fragility causes it to shatter 
when particular background conditions are met, for example, if it is dropped on a hard 
floor from a sufficient height. On this view, dispositions like fragility or solubility are 
causal powers that a vase or a cube of sugar have. What it is to be fragile is to have the 
power to shatter when dropped. Alternatively, you might think that no matter how closely 
the vase is inspected there is no property of fragility or power that can be found. Rather, 
what one finds upon observation is that the vase has a particular microstructure that 
explains its potential to shatter when it interacts with other objects like hard floors. 
In metaphysics, dispositionalists hold a view of the first kind. They claim that 
every property that a particular object has is a set of causal powers, whether that be its 
shape, material composition, electrical charge, or its fragility (Shoemaker, 1980; 
Mumford, 2004; Bird, 2007). Categoricalists hold a view of the second kind. According 
to this position, dispositional predicates like “fragility” ultimately refer to the interactions 
of categorical properties of the vase, such as its material composition with categorical 
properties of other objects (Armstrong, 1997; Lewis, 2007). When we say, “the vase is 
fragile,” this amounts to a kind of shorthand for how the actual, internal properties of the 
vase interact with actual properties of an object such as a hard floor, in accordance with 
laws of nature. These categorical properties of objects are inert without laws of nature. 
One can also take an intermediate position. Identity theorists hold that a categorical 
property and a disposition are only different ways of looking at one and the same 
property (Martin, 2007; Heil, 2010; Strawson, 2008). They prefer to use to term “quality” 
instead of “categorical property”, to avoid the implication that it is any more real or 
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actual than a disposition. Thus, according to the identity theorist, a property is identical to 
a quality, which is identical to a disposition. So the property of squareness is both the 
quality of being square-shaped and also a plurality of causal powers, or dispositions, such 
as producing a square imprint when pressed into a soft material. The property cannot be 
metaphysically reduced to one or the other.1 
What is the conceptual distinction between a quality and a disposition, though? 
There have been two general approaches to answering this question. The first is to make a 
metaphysical assumption and try to work out the distinction from there. For example, a 
categoricalist might say that a categorical/qualitative property like squareness is actual, 
while a disposition like fragility is merely potential (Armstrong, 1996). The second 
approach has been to take paradigmatic cases of each and compare them side-by-side. 
One might ask, what is it about the property that is picked out by “square-shaped,” that is 
different from the property picked out by “fragile” (Cross, 2005)? Yet, neither of these 
two approaches have produced an adequate conceptual distinction of the two.2 
In this paper I offer a new approach to solving this puzzle. This will first require a 
look at the relationship between qualitative and dispositional predicates. Drawing from 
this examination, I aim to provide a positive characterization of each type of predicate 
                                                          
1 Other intermediary views also show up in the literature. One such view is that some properties are 
qualities while others are dispositions. Another view holds that rather than a quality and a disposition 
being identical, they are instead distinct parts of the same property. For the purposes of this paper I will 
focus on categoricalism, dispositionalism, and identity theory, although if my arguments are correct, the 
consequences will apply to these other intermediate views as well. 
 
2 For example, Cross argues that both qualities and dispositions must be irreducible primary elements of 
our ontology, but offers no definitive way to identify one from the other. And, as will be discussed in more 
detail later, Taylor (2018a) argues that the two cannot be distinguished in a way that separates the identity 
theory and dispositionalist positions. He thinks the ways qualities are conceptualized is not meaningfully 
distinct from how a dispositionalist characterizes dispositions. 
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from a metaphysically neutral standpoint. Finally, I will consider possible implications 
for the metaphysical debate about properties if my characterization is correct. 
For the first two sections I assume that qualities and dispositions might be either 
real or apparent in order to remain metaphysically neutral on the nature of properties. In 
Section I I argue that a dispositional predicate applies to a particular object if and only if 
we can conceive of a qualitative predicate that is relevant to that disposition's 
manifestation.3 Ascribing one kind of predicate presupposes the ability to ascribe the 
other.4 Section II aims to make a meaningful distinction between qualitative and 
dispositional predicates. Building off of examples from Section I, we can start with the 
qualitative predicate that expresses a property and examine how that differs from a 
dispositional predicate that applies, in virtue of that property, to the same object. 
Conversely, if we start with a dispositional predicate that applies to an object, we can 
examine how the object satisfies a qualitative predicate that is relevant to the 
manifestation. From insights drawn from this exercise, I offer a positive conceptual 
characterization of each. On my account, qualitative predicates capture a property in 
isolation from other properties at a fixed moment in time, while dispositional predicates 
capture a property in relation to other properties through an activity or process over time. 
                                                          
3 Articulating precisely the way in which the predicate is relevant is difficult. Even pinpointing the exact 
nature of causal relevance is difficult (McKitrick, 2005). While this question of relevance is worth 
further investigation, I will leave it for another project. For my purposes, I simply wish to point out 
what I take to be non-controversial and non-question begging, which is that, if the vase were plastic 
instead of glass, it would no longer be fragile. Furthermore, the glass composition is relevant to the 
vase's fragility in a way that, for example, its color is not. 
4 Whether these predicates ultimately apply to real qualities and/or dispositions will depend on the 
metaphysical nature of properties. For the purposes of distinguishing the two conceptually, we need only 
see that any quality could feasibly entail a disposition and vice versa. This will be particularly important in 
cases where qualities and dispositions can be conceived but our epistemic limitations offer no way of 
verifying their existence. 
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Section III briefly considers an objection to my view based on accounts of consciousness 
as the qualitative aspect of experience. Finally, in Section IV I argue that while this does 
not rule out any metaphysical position, it does score a point in favor of the identity theory 
of properties. 
 
I. Properties in Qualitative and Dispositional Terms 
 
1a. Paradigm Cases 
 
A paradigm case of a dispositional predicate is “fragility”. To attribute fragility to 
a vase is to say that it is disposed to act in a particular way (say, to shatter) given the right 
background conditions (being struck sufficiently hard). As Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 
(1982, p. 251) point out, in the case of a vase we can identify a relevant quality, or as 
they refer to it, categorical basis that is associated with its fragility. If the vase is made of 
glass, we might point to the microstructural features of the glass as that relevant basis. 
Were the vase made of plastic instead, it would not be fragile. Thus, the vase satisfies the 
qualitative predicate, “having microstructure α”, which accounts for its fragility. Whether 
the fragility or the microstructure is ultimately real and causally efficacious, the point is 
that if you have a dispositional predicate like “fragility,” there is a related qualitative 
predicate that is relevant to the disposition's manifestation that the object also satisfies. 
Some categoricalists, like Armstrong (1996), argue that dispositions reduce to 
their categorical bases. According to this view, explaining the macro-level disposition of 
fragility involves looking at lower level details, such as the molecular bonds and 
chemical composition of the vase. Categoricalists of this kind, therefore, naturally 
descend to lower levels of explanation to find a dispositional predicate's associated 
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qualitative predicate. It is worth noting that we need not do so. If someone were to ask, 
“What makes the vase fragile?”, a perfectly sensible response would be, “That it is made 
of glass.” One other way to put this is that the dispositional predicate, “fragility” can be 
equally associated with the qualitative description, “being composed of glass,” and, 
“being composed of silicon dioxide molecules bonded in such a way.” Even if describing 
the microstructure provides greater explanatory power in some contexts, it is not as if 
only the microstructure is fragile, and the glass is not. Therefore, finding an associated 
qualitative predicate for a disposition – in this case fragility – does not require moving to 
lower levels of explanation. This will become particularly relevant later when I address 
“fundamental” dispositions, which are dispositions that cannot be attributed to lower 
level structural details. 
Beginning from the other end, a paradigm example of a qualitative predicate is 
shape. Sydney Shoemaker (1980, p. 114) uses the example of being knife-shaped, but to 
keep the illustration simple and clear we can use being square-shaped. Suppose we have a 
square block of steel. Shoemaker's argument is that despite appearing qualitative, when 
the property of squareness is combined with the property of being hard as is the case with 
the steel block, the squareness contributes to the causal powers of the block. In virtue of 
what was taken to be the purely qualitative feature of being square, the steel block has the 
disposition to leave an imprint of the same shape when pressed into soft wax. 
Shoemaker's claim is that each property comes with a set of associated causal powers. 
Therefore, all the properties of an object, even the other supposedly qualitative ones, are 
ultimately dispositional. 
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Since my account thus far is intended to be neutral, it is important to note that 
Shoemaker may be wrong to assume that his conclusions are about properties rather than 
predicates. Suppose someone like Armstrong is correct that dispositions reduce to 
categorical bases. Call the disposition to produce a square imprint if pressed into a soft 
substance like wax, squimprintability. For Armstrong, squimprintability is no more real 
or causally efficacious than fragility. Just as fragility reduced to the vase's qualitative 
microstructure, so squimprintability reduces to the qualitative shape and material 
composition of the block. Whether Shoemaker is right or not about every property being 
a set of causal powers, his analysis reveals something important about predicates. Any 
property that can be identified by a qualitative predicate, like “being square-shaped”, will 
also have related dispositional predicates, like “squimprintability,” that apply to it. 
A slightly different version of the same point is illustrated by Mellor (1982). 
Satisfying subjunctive conditionals has traditionally been a defining characteristic of 
dispositional predicates. To say that the vase is fragile is to say that, if it were dropped 
onto a hard surface, then it would shatter. However, the properties picked out by 
qualitative predicates also satisfy subjunctive conditionals, argues Mellor. If the corners 
of a triangle were properly counted, then the result would be three. As mentioned above, 
“being x-shaped” is typically considered as a paradigm case of a qualitative predicate. 
Admittedly, we might take this to mean that the relationship between subjunctive 
conditionals and dispositions has been misunderstood. However, if the standard 
assumption that there is a meaningful connection between the two is correct, I take both 
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Shoemaker and Mellor to show that even properties associated with paradigmatic cases of 
qualitative predicates can also be described dispositionally.5 
While I take paradigm cases to be a good starting point, my claim goes further. It 
is not that some properties that satisfy dispositional predicates also conceivably satisfy 
qualitative ones and vice versa. Rather, this pattern of satisfying both applies to every 
instance of a property. This means it should hold in even the most extreme cases of 
apparent qualitative and dispositional properties. Does my hypothesis stand up to such a 
challenge? 
1b. Extreme Cases 
Some philosophers have argued that there are dispositions that lack categorical 
bases entirely (Blackburn, 1990; McKitrick, 2003, 2018; Mumford, 2006). These have 
been referred to as “ungrounded”, “bare”, “pure” or “baseless” dispositions (McKitrick, 
2018, p 131). Baseless dispositions, it is argued, show that properties cannot be 
fundamentally categorical, since at the lowest-level we find only dispositions. The details 
of such a view can be spelled out in a number of ways, one of which is by reference to 
fundamental particles. The idea here is that, so far as we can tell, the fundamental 
subatomic particles are structureless but still have dispositions (e.g. spin, charge). Unlike 
the fragility of the vase, which we might attribute to the glass' microstructure, there is no 
categorical base that can explain the dispositions of a fundamental particle (Molnar, 
2003, p 132). 
                                                          
5 In Section II I will explain why subjunctive conditionals are associated with dispositions. This explanation 
follows from how I propose dispositional predicates should be characterized. So while I think the 
connection between dispositions and subjunctive conditionals is justified, at this stage I simply follow the 
common assumption [explain which assumption you are talking about] rather than argue they are 
meaningfully related. 
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Suppose such an account is correct. Let's say that a quark is this kind of entity and 
cannot be broken down into any further structural details, but satisfies the dispositional 
predicate, “spins”. Does our inability to reduce the disposition to any underlying structure 
commit us to the claim that the quark cannot possibly satisfy a qualitative predicate that 
is relevant to its spinning? Two points help to demonstrate why we are not committed to 
such a claim.  
First, as Williams (2011) argues, science is in the business of unearthing the 
effects – i.e. manifestations of the dispositions – of a thing. Regardless of what exists at 
the “fundamental” level in nature, the fundamental level discovered by science is bound 
to be one of dispositions. Williams states: 
“Because the dispositional characterization applied to the 
fundamental entities is an inescapable consequence of the 
methodology, that the characterization is exclusively 
dispositional provides no evidence that the fundamental 
properties are exclusively dispositional—even if that happens 
to be the case.” (p 79) 
 
In other words, we should not conclude that the quark's properties are purely 
dispositional from the fact that we cannot observe the quality relevant to the disposition’s 
manifestation. Rather, that we find the quark's dispositional predicates instead of its 
qualitative ones is a necessary consequence of the way in which it is investigated. 
The second point is that Williams' conclusion applies even if the quark has no 
structural details it can be broken down into. Recall the example of the vase. Finding a 
relevant qualitative predicate associated with fragility did not require descent to 
microstructural details. The glass' microstructure was not fragile in a way that the glass 
itself was not. Suppose the same is true of the quark. We can only confirm its 
dispositional predicate, “spins”.  
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However, even if it has no lower level structural details, there very well could be a 
qualitative predicate that applies to the quark that is analogous to the vase's predicate, 
“being glass.”6 We could feasibly attribute to quarks qualitative predicates based on their 
dispositional differences. For example, a quark with up-spin might be attributed the 
qualitative predicate, “being upward-oriented,” while a quark with down spin might 
satisfy the qualitative predicate, “being downward-oriented.” Which qualitative 
predicates, if any, are actually satisfied by the quark will stem from its metaphysical 
nature. While our epistemic limitations, therefore, leave verification of these qualities out 
of reach, the aim here is to explore the relationship between dispositional and qualitative 
predicates. In this case, what first appeared to be “pure” dispositions can also be 
conceived in qualitative terms that are analogous to the vase’s “being glass.” Even in this 
extreme case, the presence of a dispositional predicate brings with it the ability to 
conceive of a relevant qualitative predicate. In the absence of contradictory evidence, it 
seems plausible that every dispositional predicate is related to a qualitative one in similar 
fashion. 
Moving to qualities, arguably the most extreme version of a qualitative predicate 
comes from David Lewis (2009). According to Lewis we can conceive of an “idler,” 
which is a property that is devoid of any casual powers. While we would never be able to 
                                                          
6 Admittedly this may feel out of sync with our usual methods of explanation. It is hard to see how to 
provide an answer to the question, “Why does the quark have spin?”, if there is no underlying 
categorical basis. As an ontological account of properties, however, it does not seem particularly 
problematic for any of the positions. A categoricalist can claim that fundamental properties are 
governed by laws that account for their apparent dispositions. A dispositionalist can claim that these 
fundamental powers are exactly what the particles are. And an identity theorist would argue that it 
makes sense that fundamental particles have both dispositions and qualities, because anything with 
properties will be both dispositional and qualitative. And similarly for other mixed views of properties. 
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detect an idler, since, as we saw above, we gain knowledge of properties through their 
effects, it would nonetheless exist as a quality of some object(s). 
While many would reject even the possibility of such a property, for the sake of 
my argument the ontic status of idlers is irrelevant.7 Since my standpoint is neutral, we 
can borrow the concept of an idler without assuming the property actually exists. If any 
property ought to be impossible to describe in dispositional terms, it is an idler. However, 
even this most unlikely case of an idler can be described dispositionally. For example, we 
might form the following subjunctive conditional. If the idle property were subjected to 
any stimuli (if they can still be called that), the property would have no effect on 
surrounding properties. It also seems true to say that an idler is disposed to cease existing 
when the particular in which it is instantiated is destroyed.8 We might express this 
disposition to cease existing when the particular is destroyed by using a single 
dispositional predicate, say “extinguishability”. Despite having no causal powers, an idler 
would satisfy the dispositional predicate of “extinguishability”. Much like the case of 
what qualitative predicates are relevant to the dispositions of fundamental particles, we 
are faced with epistemic limitations. What dispositional predicates actually apply to the 
idler would necessarily remain inaccessible to us. I take this to show that regardless of 
one's view about the fundamental nature of properties, there is no property identified by a 
                                                          
7 Of course, for a dispositionalist or an identity theorist such a property could not exist. For a 
dispositionalist a property's existence is exhausted by its causal powers. Once you identify all the causal 
powers of an object, you’ve identified all the properties of that object. There could not be any additional 
property, such as an idler, that exists in the object beyond its powers. Similarly, for an identity theorist, 
what it is to be a property is to be both a quality and a power. The idea that you could have only one is 
merely abstraction. 
8 One could come up with all sorts of alternatives since it is not clear where the idler exists in the object. If 
it is something like a spirit, maybe it is not destroyed, but exists outside of the object. Or maybe the idler 
transfers to a new object, perhaps even the destroying object. No matter which way this is imagined to go, 
the point seems to hold. The property no longer exists in the object exactly as it did before. 
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qualitative predicate, that cannot satisfy a subjunctive conditional or dispositional 
predicate. 
If the picture that is laid out above is accurate, both paradigm and extreme cases 
of dispositional predicates are satisfied by objects that also (at least feasibly) satisfy 
qualitative predicates. Likewise, paradigm and extreme cases of qualitative predicates are 
satisfied by objects that can then be attributed with related dispositional predicates. The 
extreme cases are taken to be the most likely counterexamples to the claim that this 
pattern holds for predicates applied to any property, regardless of whether the property is 
metaphysically a quality, disposition, both, or some combination of the two. The claim 
that this pattern holds for every predicate that can be satisfied by a property or object is 
subject to further testing. Given the results of the extreme examples of “pure” 
dispositions and “idlers”, I take it to be likely that it does. 
 
II. Characterizing Qualities and Dispositions 
 
There is an intuitive difference between a qualitative and a dispositional predicate. 
Qualitative predicates seemingly refer to inherent features of an object, while 
dispositional predicates point outward to possible interactions. Attempts to spell this 
distinction out further have proven difficult, however (Cross, 2005; Taylor 2018a). A 
comprehensive survey of the ways qualitaties and dispositions have been distinguished is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it will be useful to at least start with a few 
examples of pitfalls that a meaningful characterization of the two needs to avoid. 
It is worth making a quick note before moving forward. The debate about how to 
distinguish qualities and dispositions has taken place within a metaphysical context. The 
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claims have been about qualitative and dispositional properties. My aim is to distinguish 
the two conceptually, while remaining (at least in this section) metaphysically neutral. 
Therefore, every claim about a categorical/qualitative or dispositional property, for my 
purposes, should not assume their ultimate or fundamental existence. While engaging the 
literature will require reference to categorical and dispositional properties, each use of the 
term property should be thought of as accompanied by, “real or apparent.” The lessons 
from the debate about distinguishing properties, however, should carry over as I attempt 
to distinguish the two concepts.  
 
2a. Problems with Past Attempts to Characterize Qualities and Dispositions 
 
The first major challenge will be to give a characterization of qualities and 
dispositions that are distinct and non-overlapping. This issue has recently been raised by 
Taylor (2018a), who argues that identity theorists – who claim that a property is both a 
quality and a disposition – ultimately collapse into dispositionalism because there is no 
account of a quality that is not equally applicable to a disposition. For example, 
categorical or qualitative properties have typically been conceived of as wholly present, 
real, actual, and/or existing in the object. Cross (2005, p. 323) states that to attribute a 
categorical property to an object is to say, “something about how [the object] actually is.” 
Heil (2012, p. 59) says that, “qualities are here and now, actual, not merely potential, 
features of the objects of which they are qualities.” Returning to a paradigm case like 
squareness helps illustrate the point. The squareness of an object is actual and present in 
the object. It does not require anything for its manifestation.  
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The problem is that for a dispositionalist a property like fragility meets all of these 
criteria. To assert that “this vase is fragile” is to attribute a wholly present, real, actual 
property of the vase, by their lights.9 Thus, we can see Taylor's concern. Armed with a 
definition of a quality such as “actual and in the object,” dispositionalism and the identity 
view collapse together. The identity theorist has nothing additional to say about a 
property qua quality that is not already captured by its dispositions. Therefore, our goal is 
to characterize the two in a way that distinguishes them from one another. If our criteria 
for qualities include “wholly present” and “actual”, and we cannot rule out these very 
same criteria for dispositions without begging the question, our characterization has 
failed. 
Other attempts to distinguish qualities are similarly unhelpful. One might define 
qualitative predicates as ones that pick out quiddities – pure categorical properties that 
lack necessary causal connections. Alternatively, categorical properties might be 
construed as simply not the same kinds of things as dispositions (Armstrong, 2005) Such 
characterizations assume that categorical properties are the ones that actually exist. Since 
this begs the question about the nature of properties, any corresponding characterization 
of dispositions will be contentious. 
Giving an adequate account of what distinguishes a dispositional predicate has 
proven equally challenging. Traditionally it was their intimate connection with non-trivial 
subjunctive conditionals that was thought to distinguish them (Cross, 2005). However, as 
                                                          
9 Heil himself points out that the way he defines qualities might overlap with the dispositions, or powers, of 
an object or property. Since he is an identity theorist, this does not pose a problem. A property is both a 
quality and a power. Therefore, that a property's quality and disposition are both “here and now, actual, 
not merely potential,” does not pose a problem or a contradiction for Heil. 
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we saw in multiple examples, even properties that are associated with the most 
paradigmatic examples of qualitative predicates entail subjunctive conditionals. Another 
way to define dispositions is as the causal powers of an object or property. The problem 
is that, like quiddities, this characterization begs the question about the nature of 
properties. Categoricalists like Armstrong and Prior et al. simply disagree with the 
definition, since they think that dispositions are not causal powers at all. So this 
distinction also offers no assistance.  
Finally, we could say that dispositions are non-qualitative, or that qualities are 
non-dispositional. This is unhelpful in two regards. The first is that defining a thing in 
terms of what it is not, is uninformative. Saying that spoons are non-forks tells me almost 
nothing about what a spoon is. To be a useful definition requires saying something more 
positive and substantive about a thing. Secondly, even this seemingly noncontroversial 
definition of qualities and dispositions begs the question if one takes it to be a statement 
about properties. The identity theorist believes that a property is identical to a quality, 
which is identical to a disposition. Therefore, according to this view, it is false to say that 
a qualitative property is non-dispositional, or that a dispositional property is non-
qualitative. 
These past attempts to characterize qualities and dispositions give us an idea of 
the issues that need to be avoided when offering an account of the two. If we hope to 
provide a meaningful conception of both qualities and dispositions, that conception must 
avoid the three problems above. Namely: 
1.It should have distinct, non-overlapping criteria for distinguishing each. 
2.It should avoid begging the question about the metaphysical nature of 
properties.  
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3.It should be a positive characterization of each – i.e. neither should be 
defined negatively in terms of the other 
 
2b. A New Approach 
 
The standard approach to understanding the difference between qualitative and 
dispositional descriptions has been to look at paradigm instances of each and compare the 
two side-by-side. What is it about squareness that is different from fragility, one might 
ask. However, if the thesis that every property can be expressed in either qualitative or 
dispositional terms (Section I) is correct, it suggests a new approach to the issue. Instead 
of picking two different properties, we can pick any single property and ask what changes 
as we go from its description in qualitative terms to its description in dispositional terms 
or vice versa.  
Take the example of squareness. What is the difference between saying of this 
image; ■  
“that is square-shaped,” and “if its corners were properly counted, the result would be 
four”? Or between saying “that block is square,” and “that block will produce a square 
imprint if pressed into soft wax”? The latter in each case introduces two things not found 
in the former. The first is a process over time. Proper counting and producing a square 
imprint are actions that occur over a period of time. Suppose we took a picture of the 
block next to a piece of wax. This represents a single instant in time. Within the 
atemporal context of the picture, the block's squareness is wholly present, but its ability 
to produce a square imprint is not. This is to say, at any moment of time t, all of an 
object's qualities are captured, in a way that its dispositions are not. It is important to note 
that this is not a metaphysical assertion. In the normal context of experience, a 
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dispositional property may be just as present and actual as a quality. The point is that 
when we conceptually strip away an object's movement through time, we isolate its 
qualities. 
The second element that the dispositional phrases add is potential interaction with 
other objects or properties. Counting the corners of a square requires a counter. Making a 
square imprint requires wax (or some other soft material). To say, “that block is square,” 
makes no reference to anything other than the block itself. The block's squareness is not 
contingent on anything outside of it, in the same way that manifesting its disposition to 
produce a square imprint is.10 Once again we must be clear on the matter. The disposition 
itself is not contingent on any another object. The vase is fragile regardless of whether it 
is struck sufficiently hard or not. However, when we ascribe a dispositional predicate to 
the square block, it points towards possible manifestations. Such manifestations are in 
fact contingent on another object. 
Going from a vase's fragility to the corresponding quality of being composed of 
glass, we see the same shift in characterization. Fragility expresses something about the 
vase in terms of how it might interact with other objects, like baseball bats or hard floors, 
over some duration of time. To get to its corresponding quality, we focus solely on the 
vase's composition without regard to any other object or property. Furthermore, to say the 
vase is made of glass does not inherently imply any duration of time. Its being made of 
glass requires, conceptually, only one moment. As the photograph example was intended 
to illustrate, it could be fully expressed in a single frame of time. 
                                                          
10 I am not the first person to point to this. Martin (1996, p. 133) suggests replacing cause and effect with 
“reciprocal disposition partners for mutual manifestation.” While we speak of the disposition of a single 
object or property, it always points to other objects or properties. 
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The resulting picture is as follows: 
Criterion of Qualitativity (CQ): A predicate describes a property qualitatively 
when (1) the predicate applying to an object does not presuppose the existence of 
any other properties or objects, and (2) it captures the property at a fixed, or 
single, moment in time. 
Criterion of Dispositionality (CD): A property is described dispositionally 
when (1) the predicate applying to an object presupposes the existence of 
other properties or objects, and (2) it points to, or implies, a process or 
activity over time. 
 
Cross seems to be pointing us in this direction when he says that dispositions are “out-
ward directed” while categorical characterizations are “purely 'inward'” (p. 323). The 
term inward is slightly misleading, though, in a way that my account is not. Inward 
implies that one needs to look inside or descend to lower levels of being to find the 
quality. A view like Armstrong's easily leads to this kind of characterization. Fragility 
reduces to some lower-level fact about the object's microstructure. As we saw, however, 
this move is not necessary. Saying that the vase is glass says something about only the 
vase (CQ1), but it is not clear that it necessarily looks inward. Put another way, it is not 
the case that the glass is some part, or component of the vase that we have to look inside 
to find. It is a property of the vase, not inside the vase.  
Cross' characterization of dispositions as outward-directed also makes sense in 
light of CD1. To say that dispositional descriptions point to external properties and 
objects (CD1) is simply to make explicit what the “outward-direction” is. A dispositional 
predicate is outwardly directed towards those possible interactions with other objects. 
Therefore, I am not accusing Cross of drastically missing the mark in his 
characterization. On the contrary, my own account can be seen as a modified version of 
the very distinction he captures. 
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The previous two paragraphs highlight the explanatory power of CQ1 and CD1. 
However, CQ2 and CD2 prove illuminating as well. Suppose someone described a block 
of polonium in terms of what was happening to the internal composition as it decayed. 
Suppose they did so without any reference to the effects of the radiation on surrounding 
objects. This appears to be a “purely inward” examination of the block (seemingly CQ1). 
I think most people's intuition is to say that we are describing the block dispositionally 
when we describe internal changes, though.  
The CD help us to account for this intuition. If we thought through this example, 
we could push back by saying that those internal changes still imply interaction with 
external objects (CD1). For example, we might say that the block's decay entails the 
emission of energy, which is bound to effect external objects, thus satisfying CD1. Much 
more straightforwardly, though, it satisfies CD2. It expresses a process over time within 
the block. The block does not have the quality of going from one internal state to another, 
it is disposed to do so over some duration. Of course, when all is said and done both 
criteria should be satisfied, so our justification for CD1 should hold as well. The point is 
merely that the CD together help to articulate our pre-existing intuition about the matter. 
My account should be viewed as not only a clarification of Cross' view, but as 
building on the intuitions of other philosophers on the subject as well. Armstrong (1997, 
p 69) says that categorical properties have a nature that is, “self-contained, distinct from 
powers.” Ignoring the metaphysical assumption that categorical properties are not also 
powers, this makes sense. “Self-contained” suggests conceptual isolation from other 
objects. If my account above is right, the self-contained, qualitative description of a 
property is at least conceptually distinct from the dispositions or powers that property 
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may have. Returning to Heil's depiction of qualities, we can see that extra emphasis 
should be put on “here” and “now”. Qualities are properties of objects here, in isolation 
from things out there (CQ1), at some particular now (CQ2). Both Armstrong and Heil's 
account of qualities can be seen as pointing towards the view I have articulated, in which 
qualities are conceptually distinct, isolated, atemporal depictions of properties. 
My account of dispositions similarly incorporates and explains past accounts. 
Claiming that dispositions are outwardly directed (Cross) or that they require disposition 
partners for manifestation (Martin, 1996) is in keeping with CD1. Both of these ways of 
framing dispositions incorporate the importance of potential interactions with other 
objects. Non-trivial subjunctive conditionals imply events (CD2) that entail multiple 
objects or properties (CD1). Recall the subjunctive conditional related to a triangle that 
has its corners counted. Counting implies both a duration of time and a counter to satisfy 
the conditional. Finally, if we equate dispositions with causal powers, causes entail some 
event (CD2) with a subsequent effect on something (CD1). The upshot of my account, 
therefore, is not simply that it remains in line with our intuitions. It also reveals the 
underlying connection between past characterizations. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that my characterization succeeds in addressing the three 
issues that other attempts have run into: 
1. The CD and CQ are distinct characterizations that do not share any 
overlapping criteria. 
2. It does not beg the question about the metaphysical nature of 
properties, as one could still hold that one characterization or the other 
captures what a property fundamentally is (This will be addressed 
further in Section IV). 
3. Neither qualitative predicates nor dispositional predicates are 
expressed negatively in relation to the other. 
 
III. The Consciousness Objection 
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One possible concern regarding this characterization of qualities is that it is not 
clear how to apply it to consciousness. In the philosophical literature, one way to 
characterize consciousness is in terms of internal, phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal 
concepts characterize experiences in virtue of their phenomenal character—for example, 
‘the experience of pain’ (Taylor, 2018b, p. 53). It seems that phenomenal concepts are 
used to describe experiences that occur over time, however. Moods, for example, seem to 
be phenomenal concepts used to express extended periods of attitudes or feelings. 
Consciousness, therefore, seems to violate CQ2. It is expressed in phenomenal concepts 
that extend over durations of time rather than ones that are captured in fixed moments as 
our criterion demands. This would refute my claim that CQ and CD apply to all qualities 
and dispositions. 
Let's characterize phenomenal qualities in the commonly employed sense, what it 
is like to be x. Another way to put this is, what it feels like to be x. We can imagine a 
particular internal state or feeling (CQ1) at time t1 (CQ2) in the same way that we can 
imagine any other quality at a fixed time.11 To return to the snapshot illustration, we 
might look back at an old picture and think, “I was really happy at that moment.” 
Furthermore, the feeling at time t1 disposes you to have other feelings as you experience 
internal change and interact with external objects12 (QD1) through activities over time 
(QD2). For instance, my happiness at the instant the photo was taken might have 
                                                          
11 Imagining any quality in purely fixed and isolated terms may very well be an abstraction. The point here 
is that imagining a feeling as fixed in a particular instant is analogous, and no less strange than imagining 
the quality of squareness as fixed in a particular instant. 
12 As was the case of describing the changes in polonium, it’s not clear exactly what the best way to spell 
this out is. We could imagine describing mental changes that give rise to conscious feeling in terms of 
internal change rather than in terms of interactions with external objects. Just how much these internal 
changes point to, or imply external interactions is admittedly hazy in the account given here. 
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disposed me to act kindly towards others during the rest of that day.13 Thus, we have a 
phenomenal concept, happiness, that can be expressed in both qualitative and 
dispositional terms that satisfy CQ and CD. We can characterize happiness as captured in 
a single moment with reference to only the individual experiencing it, and we can 
characterize it as a disposition to have other phenomenal experiences in relation to other 
objects over time. 
Much more would need to be fleshed out for a full defense of this view. Part of 
the challenge is simply the fact that consciousness remains a difficult topic. Therefore, 
my aspirations for this section remain modest. If the preceding paragraph at least offers 
one plausible route for understanding consciousness that is in keeping with CQ and CD, 
it has accomplished its aim. Pending a compelling and more complete account of 
consciousness that is in conflict with my characterization of categorical and dispositional 
predicates, I hope to have warded off initial concerns about the relationship between my 




IV. Metaphysical Consequences 
 
Suppose that the arguments from Section I and II hold. That is to say, suppose 
that every property, whether fundamentally categorical, dispositional, both, or some 
combination of the two, can at least be expressed qualitatively or dispositionally. 
                                                          
13 I wish to avoid entering the discussion about the relationship between physical and phenomenal states, so 
I will not pursue the discussion deeply. However, the point might be illustrated even further by looking 
at the physical realizers of a particular conscious state and how a particular configuration at t1 leads to 
subsequent configurations with similar conscious states. There might, therefore, be analogous 
qualitative and dispositional characterizations of the physical states that coincide with the qualitative 
and dispositional characterizations of the phenomenal experience. 
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Furthermore, suppose that qualitative descriptions are static and self-contained, while 
dispositional descriptions point to processes over time and external objects. Does 
applying these conclusions to the metaphysical debate about the nature of properties offer 
any assistance or insight? 
I think the answer is both yes and no. As we would expect in a metaphysical 
debate, applying these conclusions does not leave us with an indisputable winner. The 
categoricalist can still say that we reveal what a property really is when we express it in 
fixed, isolated terms. The dispositionalist can still claim that what a property really is, is 
exhausted by its dynamic effects on other properties. In terms of settling the debate, 
therefore, these conclusions prove insufficient. 
What I do think this account sheds light on, is what exactly each side must be 
willing to give up in order to defend their position. The categoricalist's ontology reduces 
to only the properties we can capture in still frames. What things really are is a series of 
these still frames connected by laws. Being, as opposed to becoming, is fundamental.14 
Of course, contemporary categoricalists are not the first to defend such a position. 
Ontological accounts that afford being primacy and deem becoming (i.e. change) merely 
an illusion date back to Parmenides. While the views of modern categoricalists and 
Parmenides also have dissimilarities, highlighting the commonality they share in 
emphasizing being does elucidate what many philosophers find so unsettling about 
categoricalism. What is the source of change? Why is being any more fundamental than 
becoming? What are these “laws” posited by categoricalists that connect distinct 
instances of being? 
                                                          
14 This is not a completely novel idea in metaphysics. Strawson (2008) explicitly equates categorical with 
being. 
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On the other hand, the dispositionalist faces challenges of their own. The only 
being an object has is its power to affect other objects through time. That object imagined 
in abstraction, atemporally and isolated from all other objects cannot cause anything at 
all. Therefore, the dispositionalist seems committed to saying that an object at a single 
instant, in isolation from all other objects is no-thing at all.15 The dispositionalist's 
ontology is fundamentally becoming. This kind of ontological reduction also has ancient 
roots in the writings of Heraclitus, who famously claimed that everything is flux. This 
kind of view leads to puzzling questions. If a property is nothing but a set of powers, why 
does it feel as though we are saying something meaningful when we make a claim about 
how an object is, apart from what it can do? If dispositions point to potential interactions, 
and an object is nothing more than its dispositions, what is ever actual or actualized? 
By my lights this at least gives a nod towards the intuitions of identity theorists 
like Martin and Heil. When we imagine a property as static and isolated, this is an 
abstraction. We simply do not experience properties in this way. Observing, discovering, 
and conceiving that the vase is made of glass are all events that happen in time. However, 
we still seem to capture something real and meaningful about the vase without 
referencing its causal powers. One aspect of what it is to be a property is to have this kind 
of identifiable, fixed nature at a given time. Fragility, by contrast, always points to future 
possibilities. Its meaning relies on our ability to conceive of such possibilities. Ascribing 
dispositions involves similar abstraction. The fragility of the vase implies possible 
                                                          
15 One possible response is to simply deny that such abstraction is truly conceivable. This would certainly 
be an interesting argument, but a sufficient analysis and response is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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manifestations that may never be actualized. Yet ascribing fragility still seems to tell us 
something meaningful about the vase. 
According to the identity view, a property is identical to a disposition, which is 
identical to a quality. Suppose this is true. In each instance in which we identify a 
property, we should expect that it could be viewed in both qualitative and dispositional 
terms. If my argument from Section I is correct, that is precisely the case. Each instance 
of a property typically identified as a disposition has an accompanying qualitative 
characterization and vice versa. Furthermore, if the identity view is correct, we would 
also expect that the qualitative and dispositional aspects of a property are merely different 
ways of looking at, or understanding, one and the same thing. If the characterization I 
offer in Section II is correct, that expectation is also met. According to my account, 
describing a property in qualitative and dispositional terms are two distinct ways of 
looking at a given property. Finally, if my analysis from Section IV is accurate, the 
identity view most adequately captures our natural intuitions that being and becoming are 
equally real or fundamental. Objects seem to have the inherent potential to cause change 
in other things. But that potential is in virtue of what they are, rather than what the thing 
itself is. While perhaps not a decisive blow, it does seem that if the arguments of this 
paper are sound, it at least scores a point in favor of the identity view. 
V. Conclusion 
The standard approach to characterizing qualities and dispositions has been to 
start from a metaphysical position, like categoricalism or dispositionalism, and articulate 
one's preferred conception from there. A dispositionalist might assert that qualities do not 
have any distinct ontology or meaningful character, since in actuality they are a set of 
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causal powers – i.e. dispositions. This essay has attempted to show that approaches of 
this sort have been misguided. Instead we should start from a metaphysically neutral 
perspective. When we do so, we see that qualitative and dispositional predicates never 
appear exclusively of one another. Regardless of whether qualities or dispositions are 
fundamental, ascribing one type of predicate to an object entails the possibility of 
attributing the other. 
Furthermore, a neutral standpoint allows us to positively characterize both 
qualities and dispositions in a way that reveals what a categoricalist or dispositionalist 
must be willing to sacrifice in their ontology. The categoricalist is stuck with a series of 
instants. What is real are the properties contained within each isolated instant of pure 
being. The dispositionalist is stuck with an ontology that is pure powers, producing more 
powers, that point to potential future powers. This view reduces a thing's being to only 
what it might become. I, for one, think our ontology should afford space for both being 
and becoming. If every property can be viewed both qualitatively and dispositionally, 
why suppose we are looking at two different things? The most reasonable thing to say is 
that we are in fact looking at a single property in two ways. Therefore, if my 
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